really drop SSLv2

[James Westby]

On Mon, 09 Aug 2010 10:43:45 -0400, Etienne Goyer <etienne.goyer at canonical.com> wrote:
> If you are connecting to a malicious party in the first place, the
> problem is not the cipher.

Agreed in general. Without specific attack models it's hard to say
definitively.

> If there are attacks where a malicious third-party can manipulate the
> cipher negotiation between two legitimate endpoints, then I could see
> the point of disabling weak cipher.  Otherwise, it still evade me.

I forget the term, but provided that the compromise of one session key
does not aid an attacker in compromising others, nor the long-term
secret key, then yes, it's generally not an issue.

Many people still like to disable it to protect against issues such as a
buggy client negotiating the weakest cipher instead of the strongest one
(I believe this has happened.)

Thanks,

James