[UPSTREAM][RFC PATCH] integrity: add informational messages when revoking certs.

[Dimitri John Ledkov]

On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 3:48 PM Krzysztof Kozlowski
<krzysztof.kozlowski at canonical.com> wrote:
>
> On 10/05/2021 10:40, Dimitri John Ledkov wrote:
> > integrity_load_cert() prints messages of the source and cert details
> > when adding certs as trusted. Mirror those messages in
> > uefi_revocation_list_x509() when adding certs as revoked.
> >
> > Sample dmesg with this change:
> >
> >     [    1.538741] integrity: Platform Keyring initialized
> >     [    1.960071] integrity: Loading X.509 certificate: UEFI:db
> >     [    1.961986] integrity: Loaded X.509 cert 'Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011: 13adbf4309bd82709c8cd54f316ed522988a1bd4'
> >     [    1.974041] integrity: Revoking X.509 certificate: UEFI:MokListXRT (MOKvar table)
> >     [    1.978852] blacklist: Revoked X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing: 61482aa2830d0ab2ad5af10b7250da9033ddcef0'
> >     [    1.985850] integrity: Loading X.509 certificate: UEFI:MokListRT (MOKvar table)
> >     [    1.989651] integrity: Loaded X.509 cert 'Canonical Ltd. Master Certificate Authority: ad91990bc22ab1f517048c23b6655a268e345a63'
>
> Strip the [] from the dmesg. They make it harder to read.
>

OK


> >
> > Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov at canonical.com>
> > ---
> >
> >  Another RFC patch that I'd like to submit upstream, based on
> >  v5.13-rc1.
>
> I think you can just send it upstream and get the comments there. It's
> not confidential (already made public through kernel-team list) and
> upstream (specialized) folks might know this pieces better than us.
>
> >
> >  certs/blacklist.c                                   | 4 ++++
> >  security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 1 +
> >  2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
> > index c9a435b15af40..738c496756516 100644
> > --- a/certs/blacklist.c
> > +++ b/certs/blacklist.c
> > @@ -172,6 +172,10 @@ int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
> >       if (IS_ERR(key)) {
> >               pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
> >               return PTR_ERR(key);
> > +     } else {
> > +             pr_notice("Revoked X.509 cert '%s'\n",
> > +                       key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
> > +             key_ref_put(key);
>
> This seems unrelated, based on the commit description. Why do you need it?

I think the original code today is leaky. I thought that after calling
key_create_or_update() one should call key_ref_put(key) too.....

I wonder if I should mention that in the commit message, or send it separately.

-- 
Regards,

Dimitri.