From: Philip Whineray <phil at firehol.org>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1584953
Various files are owned by root with 0440 permission. Reading them is
impossible in an unprivileged user namespace, interfering with firewall
tools. For instance, iptables-save relies on /proc/net/ip_tables_names
contents to dump only loaded tables.
This patch assigned ownership of the following files to root in the
current namespace:
- /proc/net/*_tables_names
- /proc/net/*_tables_matches
- /proc/net/*_tables_targets
- /proc/net/nf_conntrack
- /proc/net/nf_conntrack_expect
- /proc/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log
A mapping for root must be available, so this order should be followed:
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER);
/* Setup the mapping */
unshare(CLONE_NEWNET);
Signed-off-by: Philip Whineray <phil at firehol.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo at netfilter.org>
(cherry picked from commit f13f2aeed154da8e48f90b85e720f8ba39b1e881)
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee at canonical.com>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 7 +++++++
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 +++++++
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 12 ++++++++++++
4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c
index acf5c7b..278927a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c
@@ -596,11 +596,18 @@ static int exp_proc_init(struct net *net)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_PROCFS
struct proc_dir_entry *proc;
+ kuid_t root_uid;
+ kgid_t root_gid;
proc = proc_create("nf_conntrack_expect", 0440, net->proc_net,
&exp_file_ops);
if (!proc)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
+ root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
+ if (uid_valid(root_uid) && gid_valid(root_gid))
+ proc_set_user(proc, root_uid, root_gid);
#endif /* CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_PROCFS */
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 1fb3cac..0f1a45b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -392,11 +392,18 @@ static const struct file_operations ct_cpu_seq_fops = {
static int nf_conntrack_standalone_init_proc(struct net *net)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde;
+ kuid_t root_uid;
+ kgid_t root_gid;
pde = proc_create("nf_conntrack", 0440, net->proc_net, &ct_file_ops);
if (!pde)
goto out_nf_conntrack;
+ root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
+ root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
+ if (uid_valid(root_uid) && gid_valid(root_gid))
+ proc_set_user(pde, root_uid, root_gid);
+
pde = proc_create("nf_conntrack", S_IRUGO, net->proc_net_stat,
&ct_cpu_seq_fops);
if (!pde)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c
index 740cce4..dea4676 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c
@@ -1064,15 +1064,26 @@ static int __net_init nfnl_log_net_init(struct net *net)
{
unsigned int i;
struct nfnl_log_net *log = nfnl_log_pernet(net);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+ struct proc_dir_entry *proc;
+ kuid_t root_uid;
+ kgid_t root_gid;
+#endif
for (i = 0; i < INSTANCE_BUCKETS; i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&log->instance_table[i]);
spin_lock_init(&log->instances_lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
- if (!proc_create("nfnetlink_log", 0440,
- net->nf.proc_netfilter, &nful_file_ops))
+ proc = proc_create("nfnetlink_log", 0440,
+ net->nf.proc_netfilter, &nful_file_ops);
+ if (!proc)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
+ root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
+ if (uid_valid(root_uid) && gid_valid(root_gid))
+ proc_set_user(proc, root_uid, root_gid);
#endif
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
index 865cf73..17a9a9f 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/x_tables.h>
@@ -1229,6 +1230,8 @@ int xt_proto_init(struct net *net, u_int8_t af)
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
char buf[XT_FUNCTION_MAXNAMELEN];
struct proc_dir_entry *proc;
+ kuid_t root_uid;
+ kgid_t root_gid;
#endif
if (af >= ARRAY_SIZE(xt_prefix))
@@ -1236,12 +1239,17 @@ int xt_proto_init(struct net *net, u_int8_t af)
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+ root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
+ root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
+
strlcpy(buf, xt_prefix[af], sizeof(buf));
strlcat(buf, FORMAT_TABLES, sizeof(buf));
proc = proc_create_data(buf, 0440, net->proc_net, &xt_table_ops,
(void *)(unsigned long)af);
if (!proc)
goto out;
+ if (uid_valid(root_uid) && gid_valid(root_gid))
+ proc_set_user(proc, root_uid, root_gid);
strlcpy(buf, xt_prefix[af], sizeof(buf));
strlcat(buf, FORMAT_MATCHES, sizeof(buf));
@@ -1249,6 +1257,8 @@ int xt_proto_init(struct net *net, u_int8_t af)
(void *)(unsigned long)af);
if (!proc)
goto out_remove_tables;
+ if (uid_valid(root_uid) && gid_valid(root_gid))
+ proc_set_user(proc, root_uid, root_gid);
strlcpy(buf, xt_prefix[af], sizeof(buf));
strlcat(buf, FORMAT_TARGETS, sizeof(buf));
@@ -1256,6 +1266,8 @@ int xt_proto_init(struct net *net, u_int8_t af)
(void *)(unsigned long)af);
if (!proc)
goto out_remove_matches;
+ if (uid_valid(root_uid) && gid_valid(root_gid))
+ proc_set_user(proc, root_uid, root_gid);
#endif
return 0;
--
2.7.4