[Bug 2019094] Re: [SRU] Focal: TLS 1.3 doesn't work on strict firewall/middlebox
Andreas Hasenack
2019094 at bugs.launchpad.net
Thu May 25 20:54:26 UTC 2023
I think you should go ahead and ask for a review from the security team
in parallel.
Thanks for all the care in checking reverse dependencies, and related
DEP8 tests! Do keep in mind, though, that it's possible that many of
these tests may not be exercising TLSv1.3 specifically, client or
server-side.
First question that popped into my mind is what are the other crypto implementations in focal doing regarding the session id in TLSv1.3's ClientHello?
- openssl: non-empty according to my tests
- nss: unknown (affects browsers, like firefox and chromium)
It would also help a bit to better measure the impact of this if we knew
what application is being blocked at the firewall. Is it something from
the archive, like perhaps apt-get using https:// repositories? IIRC it
uses gnutls. Or a third-party app linked with gnutls?
This change will take more time to review and evaluate.
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2019094
Title:
[SRU] Focal: TLS 1.3 doesn't work on strict firewall/middlebox
Status in gnutls28 package in Ubuntu:
Invalid
Status in gnutls28 source package in Focal:
In Progress
Bug description:
[ Impact ]
* On Focal, the TLS 1.3 handshake might fail on strict
(or misbehaving) proprietary firewall/middlebox that
requires a non-empty Session ID (as TLS 1.2) per RFC.
* The RFC specifies the ClientHello should always have
a non-empty session ID, but this _is_ empty in Focal.
* RFC 8446, Appendix D.4. Middlebox Compatibility Mode [1]
"""
... a significant number of middleboxes misbehave
when a TLS client/server pair negotiates TLS 1.3.
... handshake look more like a TLS 1.2 handshake:
- The client always provides a non-empty session ID
in the ClientHello, ...
"""
* Reverse build dependencies that link against the
static libraries in libgnutls28-dev
would need No-Change Rebuilds to pick up this fix.
(see `reverse-depends -b -r focal libgnutls28-dev`)
However, none were found (details in comment #8).
[ Test Plan ]
* Check whether TLS 1.3 handshake has `Session ID:`
- Focal (no):
$ gnutls-cli --priority NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 ubuntu.com </dev/null
...
- Description: (TLS1.3-X.509)-...
- Options:
- Handshake was completed
...
- Jammy (yes):
$ gnutls-cli --priority NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 ubuntu.com </dev/null
...
- Description: (TLS1.3-X.509)-...
- Session ID: CB:7D:DF:...
- Options:
- Handshake was completed
...
* Check tests run at build time (`Testsuite summary for GnuTLS`).
Tests passed per the build log from PPA with test packages:
===================================
Testsuite summary for GnuTLS 3.6.13
===================================
* Check autopkgtests from gnutls28 against PPA/SRU [4,6].
Tests passed against PPA with test packages:
autopkgtest [12:40:02]: @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ summary
run-upstream-testsuite PASS
* Check autopkgtests from reverse test triggers against PPA/SRU
(see comment #12).
$ reverse-depends -b -r focal src:gnutls28
Reverse-Testsuite-Triggers
* ...
* (Internal) Verify the original reporter's proprietary
firewall/middlebox now works with TLS 1.3 from GnuTLS.
There is a test package available in the following ppa:
https://launchpad.net/~mruffell/+archive/ubuntu/sf359157-test
If you install the test package, the session ID is set
correctly.
[ Regression Potential ]
* TLS 1.3 handshake now includes non-empty Session ID
in ClientHello, so there's a behavior change in the
Client side-only, but it does affect how particular
Servers handle the client, depending on Session ID.
* Thus, theoretically, if issues were to occur, that
likely would manifest as client connection errors
with TLS 1.3 (failures would be realized early and
fast), and a workaround available is using TLS 1.2.
* Even though changes to TLS handshake understandably
may be scary (considering the impact of regressions),
the proposed change is specified by the RFC (and is
there to help w/ wider compatibility) and is already
implemented in later versions (3.7.1 in Hirsute [5]).
[ Other Info ]
* Bionic is not impacted (TLS 1.2 only)
* Jammy and later already fixed (TLS 1.3 on GnuTLS 3.7+)
The fixes required are:
commit e0bb98e1f71f94691f600839ff748d3a9f469d3e
Author: Norbert Pocs <npocs at redhat.com>
Date: Fri Oct 30 17:18:30 2020 +0100
Subject: Fix non-empty session id (TLS13_APPENDIX_D4)
Link: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/e0bb98e1f71f94691f600839ff748d3a9f469d3e
commit 5416fdc259d8df9b797d249f3e5d58789b2e2cf9
Author: Daiki Ueno <ueno at gnu.org>
Date: Wed Feb 3 15:50:08 2021 +0100
Subject: gnutls_session_is_resumed: don't check session ID in TLS 1.3
Link: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/5416fdc259d8df9b797d249f3e5d58789b2e2cf9
commit 05ee0d49fe93d8812ef220c7b830c4b3553ac4fd
Author: Daiki Ueno <ueno at gnu.org>
Date: Sun Jan 24 07:34:24 2021 +0100
Subject: handshake: TLS 1.3: don't generate session ID in resumption mode
Link: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/05ee0d49fe93d8812ef220c7b830c4b3553ac4fd
commit 24c9a24640c137b47bb1e8cc5fee2315f57219ad
Author: Daiki Ueno <ueno at gnu.org>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 16:42:01 +0200
Subject: handshake: don't regenerate legacy_session_id in second CH after HRR
Link: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/24c9a24640c137b47bb1e8cc5fee2315f57219ad
[ Links ]
[1] https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446#appendix-D.4
[4] https://autopkgtest.ubuntu.com/packages/g/gnutls28
[5] https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/gnutls28/3.7.1-3ubuntu1
[6] https://autopkgtest.ubuntu.com/results/autopkgtest-focal-mruffell-sf359157-test/focal/amd64/g/gnutls28/20230524_124015_b6884@/log.gz
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