[ubuntu/zesty-proposed] apport 2.20.4-0ubuntu1 (Accepted)
Martin Pitt
martin.pitt at ubuntu.com
Wed Dec 14 22:03:12 UTC 2016
apport (2.20.4-0ubuntu1) zesty; urgency=medium
* New upstream release:
- SECURITY FIX: Restrict a report's CrashDB field to literals.
Use ast.literal_eval() instead of the generic eval(), to prevent
arbitrary code execution from malicious .crash files. A user could be
tricked into opening a crash file whose CrashDB field contains an
exec(), open(), or similar commands; this is fairly easy as we install a
MIME handler for these. Thanks to Donncha O'Cearbhaill for discovering
this! (CVE-2016-9949, LP: #1648806)
- SECURITY FIX: Fix path traversal vulnerability with hooks execution.
Ensure that Package: and SourcePackage: fields loaded from reports do
not contain directories. Until now, an attacker could trick a user into
opening a malicious .crash file containing "Package:
../../../../some/dir/foo" which would execute /some/dir/foo.py with
arbitrary code. Thanks to Donncha O'Cearbhaill for discovering this!
(CVE-2016-9950, LP: #1648806)
- SECURITY FIX: apport-{gtk,kde}: Only offer "Relaunch" for recent
/var/crash crashes.
It only makes sense to offer relaunching for crashes that just happened
and the apport UI got triggered on those. When opening a .crash file
copied from somewhere else or after the crash happened, this is even
actively dangerous as a malicious crash file can specify any arbitrary
command to run. Thanks to Donncha O'Cearbhaill for discovering this!
(CVE-2016-9951, LP: #1648806)
- backends/packaging-apt-dpkg.py: provide a fallback method if using zgrep
to search for a file in Contents.gz fails due to a lack of memory.
Thanks Brian Murray.
- bin/apport-retrace: When --core-file is used instead of loading the core
file and adding it to the apport report just pass the file reference to
gdb.
* debian/control: Adjust Vcs-Bzr: for zesty branch.
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 21:28:57 +0100
Changed-By: Martin Pitt <martin.pitt at ubuntu.com>
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apport/2.20.4-0ubuntu1
-------------- next part --------------
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Hash: SHA256
Format: 1.8
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 21:28:57 +0100
Source: apport
Binary: apport python-problem-report python3-problem-report python-apport python3-apport apport-retrace apport-valgrind apport-gtk apport-kde dh-apport apport-noui
Architecture: source
Version: 2.20.4-0ubuntu1
Distribution: zesty
Urgency: medium
Maintainer: Martin Pitt <martin.pitt at ubuntu.com>
Changed-By: Martin Pitt <martin.pitt at ubuntu.com>
Description:
apport - automatically generate crash reports for debugging
apport-gtk - GTK+ frontend for the apport crash report system
apport-kde - KDE frontend for the apport crash report system
apport-noui - tools for automatically reporting Apport crash reports
apport-retrace - tools for reprocessing Apport crash reports
apport-valgrind - valgrind wrapper that first downloads debug symbols
dh-apport - debhelper extension for the apport crash report system
python-apport - Python library for Apport crash report handling
python-problem-report - Python library to handle problem reports
python3-apport - Python 3 library for Apport crash report handling
python3-problem-report - Python 3 library to handle problem reports
Launchpad-Bugs-Fixed: 1648806
Changes:
apport (2.20.4-0ubuntu1) zesty; urgency=medium
.
* New upstream release:
- SECURITY FIX: Restrict a report's CrashDB field to literals.
Use ast.literal_eval() instead of the generic eval(), to prevent
arbitrary code execution from malicious .crash files. A user could be
tricked into opening a crash file whose CrashDB field contains an
exec(), open(), or similar commands; this is fairly easy as we install a
MIME handler for these. Thanks to Donncha O'Cearbhaill for discovering
this! (CVE-2016-9949, LP: #1648806)
- SECURITY FIX: Fix path traversal vulnerability with hooks execution.
Ensure that Package: and SourcePackage: fields loaded from reports do
not contain directories. Until now, an attacker could trick a user into
opening a malicious .crash file containing "Package:
../../../../some/dir/foo" which would execute /some/dir/foo.py with
arbitrary code. Thanks to Donncha O'Cearbhaill for discovering this!
(CVE-2016-9950, LP: #1648806)
- SECURITY FIX: apport-{gtk,kde}: Only offer "Relaunch" for recent
/var/crash crashes.
It only makes sense to offer relaunching for crashes that just happened
and the apport UI got triggered on those. When opening a .crash file
copied from somewhere else or after the crash happened, this is even
actively dangerous as a malicious crash file can specify any arbitrary
command to run. Thanks to Donncha O'Cearbhaill for discovering this!
(CVE-2016-9951, LP: #1648806)
- backends/packaging-apt-dpkg.py: provide a fallback method if using zgrep
to search for a file in Contents.gz fails due to a lack of memory.
Thanks Brian Murray.
- bin/apport-retrace: When --core-file is used instead of loading the core
file and adding it to the apport report just pass the file reference to
gdb.
* debian/control: Adjust Vcs-Bzr: for zesty branch.
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