[ubuntu/xenial-proposed] linux-kvm 4.4.0-1026.31 (Accepted)

[Andy Whitcroft]

linux-kvm (4.4.0-1026.31) xenial; urgency=medium

  * Xenial update to 4.4.118 stable release (LP: #1756866)
    - kvm: [config] Add CONFIG_DST_CACHE=y

  * getlogin will fail to open /proc/self/loginuid (LP: #1770245)
    - Config: Enable CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL

  [ Ubuntu: 4.4.0-127.153 ]

  * CVE-2018-3639 (powerpc)
    - powerpc/pseries: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
    - powerpc/powernv: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
    - powerpc/rfi-flush: Move the logic to avoid a redo into the debugfs code
    - powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again
    - powerpc/rfi-flush: Always enable fallback flush on pseries
    - powerpc/rfi-flush: Differentiate enabled and patched flush types
    - powerpc/rfi-flush: Call setup_rfi_flush() after LPM migration
    - powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags
    - powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown
    - powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags
    - powerpc/powernv: Set or clear security feature flags
    - powerpc/64s: Move cpu_show_meltdown()
    - powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_meltdown()
    - powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush()
    - powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush()
    - powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v1()
    - powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()
    - powerpc/pseries: Fix clearing of security feature flags
    - powerpc: Move default security feature flags
    - powerpc/pseries: Restore default security feature flags on setup
    - SAUCE: powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel
      entry/exit
  * CVE-2018-3639 (x86)
    - SAUCE: Clean up IBPB and IBRS control functions and macros
    - SAUCE: Fix up IBPB and IBRS kernel parameters documentation
    - SAUCE: Remove #define X86_FEATURE_PTI
    - x86/cpufeature: Move some of the scattered feature bits to x86_capability
    - x86/cpufeature: Cleanup get_cpu_cap()
    - x86/cpu: Probe CPUID leaf 6 even when cpuid_level == 6
    - x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
    - x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
    - SAUCE: x86/kvm: Expose SPEC_CTRL from the leaf
    - x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
    - x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
    - SAUCE: x86/msr: Rename MSR spec control feature bits
    - x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
    - x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes
    - x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
    - x86/speculation: Add <asm/msr-index.h> dependency
    - x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
    - x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel
    - SAUCE: x86/speculation: Move vendor specific IBRS/IBPB control code
    - SAUCE: x86: Add alternative_msr_write
    - SAUCE: x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write()
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting into a separate function
    - arch: Introduce post-init read-only memory
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass
    - SAUCE: x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable
      mitigation
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if
      requested
    - SAUCE: x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest
    - SAUCE: x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell
    - SAUCE: prctl: Add speculation control prctls
    - x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra()
    - SAUCE: x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass
    - SAUCE: x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
    - SAUCE: nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task
    - SAUCE: proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations
    - SAUCE: seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Honour SPEC_CTRL default
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init
    - SAUCE: prctl: Add force disable speculation
    - SAUCE: seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE
    - selftest/seccomp: Fix the flag name SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
    - SAUCE: seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation
    - SAUCE: seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code
    - SAUCE: x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative
      Store Bypass
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD
    - SAUCE: proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status'
    - SAUCE: Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type
    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static
    - x86/entry: define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK flags explicitly
    - Revert "x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2
      microcodes"
    - SAUCE: kvm/cpuid: Fix CPUID_7_0.EDX handling

Date: 2018-05-20 14:44:14.046064+00:00
Changed-By: Juerg Haefliger <juergh at canonical.com>
Signed-By: Andy Whitcroft <apw at canonical.com>
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux-kvm/4.4.0-1026.31
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