Wiping Out Data

[Matthew Flaschen]

Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote:
>> I'll do the same, and reiterate that filesystems are irrelevant when
>> you're operating at the device level.
> 
> Not so easy to accomplish in fact, and even if it's done perfectly the
> hardware itself might booger things up...
> 
> http://wipe.sourceforge.net/

The hardware could certainly interfere, but if you use the actual /dev
file neither the software nor filesystem should.  Of course, once
someone hypervisors you, you can't really know whether that's the real
/dev, or just part of the VM.  The best thing is to take the red pill to
exit the Matrix, then degauss the drives.

> I think you're overlooking the carefully chosen phrase "practical
> world". People don't generally live for unlimited periods of time or
> have the processing muscle at their disposal to launch successful
> attacks against strong cryptography.

I'll agree with the first part :), but <tinfoil>I'm not so sure any
generally available cryptography is beyond the reach of certain
government agencies</tinfoil>

> No sane person would ever suggest good crypto
> isn't crackable (OTP aside), it's always been a cat and mouse game where
> the mouse makes it so outlandishly difficult for the cat, poor kitty
> knows trying is futile and looks elsewhere.

True.

> And we haven't even begun to discuss the issue of encrypted data
> reaching end of life and making even the cracking of encryption itself,
> irrelevant. :)

Some data never really goes EOL.  It's just a question of how /much/
people still care.  I'd still be interested in knowing whether
<tinfoil>William Randolph Hearst did sink the U.S.S. Maine after
all</tinfoil>.

Matthew Flaschen