New ZeroConf Spec

[Scott James Remnant]

On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 17:12 +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:

> Scott James Remnant writes ("Re: New ZeroConf Spec"):
> > Not really; even if you use decent filtering, it's still boringly easy
> > to forge UDP packets and inject them into the listening application --
> > there being no sequence number, etc. in the UDP header.
> 
> We were discussing DNS.  DNS packets have a 16-bit id field which must
> be replicated in the response.  However, not all implementations set
> it randomly (mine doesn't, for example!) so you must protect your
> resolver from forged responses.
> 
I'm not sure this is also true for Multicast DNS, where updates can be
sent across the network unanticipated.

Scott
-- 
Scott James Remnant
scott at ubuntu.com
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