Hi all I think putting a password by default on the grub booter just adds another level of unnecessary complexity for users. Enabling it by default you force people to learn another password which they then have to type in every time you boot etc etc. I think a better option would be to allow the system admin to set a grub password during installation if need be. Regards, <div>On 15/05/07, Sven <<a href="mailto:sven.lug-dorsten@gmx.de">sven.lug-dorsten@gmx.de</a>> wrote:<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;"> hello ubuntu developers! Jerome redirected me from my bug report #114838 to your audience. In short terms: I propose that during grub setup/configuration the grub password in menu.lst is activated by default. Please let me explain why. With the actual Ubuntu default settings anyone can easily gather root-privileges by rebooting and pressing e to enter edit mode in grub and add a init=/bin/bash kernel option. He can go on and do everything then. To establish a secure system with today's Ubuntu versions one would have to: 1) decide what requirements on protecting direct hardware modifications must to be established 2) set up the harddisk as the only boot-device, and protect this BIOS setting with a password 3) set up a Grub password to prevent boot-option modifications #1 and #2 are totally out of the operating system's focus, but #3 is something I'd like to talk about. To prevent this unauthorized boot-modifications gaining root-access, grub contains a password command line in menu.lst including a --md5 option. If we set this password and don't change anything different in menu.lst, the only thing that changes is: grub options can not be modified and Grub's command line can not be opened to do different things. The Grub password can be be user defined during installation or be a random generated password, choosing a empty password deactivates Grub's password option. Then, assuming someone cared for #1 and #2, Grub's menu.lst can only be modified from the booted computer by an authenticated user. I think this is a little change most Ubuntu users wont even notice because they just use the grub manager to boot from the menu list, which will continue to work flawlessly. I think this "bug" is critical, because its nearly as simple as pressing a key during boot to gain root access. Most people i tell this did not know its so easy to compromise their linux system, which they installed because they thought its more secure than the "other os". Well it could be. Additional my proposal, i've seen a bug report comlaining about the alternate installation's grub password setup. It exists but it doesnt use the md5 hash method of grub, but clear text. The password is stored in menu.lst which is in 644 mode and everyone can read it. kind regards, Sven -- Ubuntu-devel-discuss mailing list <a href="mailto:Ubuntu-devel-discuss@lists.ubuntu.com">Ubuntu-devel-discuss@lists.ubuntu.com </a> Modify settings or unsubscribe at: <a href="https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-devel-discuss">https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-devel-discuss</a> </blockquote></div> -- Matthew G Larsen > <a href="mailto:mat.larsen@gmail.com">mat.larsen@gmail.com</a> > +44(0)7739 785 249