[ubuntu/trusty-security] linux-lts-vivid 3.19.0-65.73~14.04.1 (Accepted)

[Andy Whitcroft]

linux-lts-vivid (3.19.0-65.73~14.04.1) trusty; urgency=low

  [ Ben Romer ]

  * Release Tracking Bug
    - LP: #1596643

  [ Josh Boyer ]

  * SAUCE: UEFI: acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module
    loading is restricted
    - LP: #1566221
  * SAUCE: UEFI: efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI
    - LP: #1566221
  * SAUCE: UEFI MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
    - LP: #1571691
  * SAUCE: UEFI: efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
    - LP: #1571691

  [ Matthew Garrett ]

  * SAUCE: UEFI: Add secure_modules() call
    - LP: #1566221
  * SAUCE: UEFI: PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled
    - LP: #1566221
  * SAUCE: UEFI: x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is
    enabled
    - LP: #1566221
  * SAUCE: UEFI: ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
    - LP: #1566221
  * SAUCE: UEFI: asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading
    is restricted
    - LP: #1566221
  * SAUCE: UEFI: Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
    restricted
    - LP: #1566221
  * SAUCE: UEFI: kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
    loading restrictions
    - LP: #1566221
  * SAUCE: UEFI: x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted
    - LP: #1566221
  * SAUCE: UEFI: Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when
    in Secure Boot mode
    - LP: #1566221

  [ Stefan Bader ]

  * [Config] Add pm80xx scsi driver to d-i
    - LP: #1595628

  [ Tim Gardner ]

  * [Config] CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE=y
  * SAUCE: UEFI: Display MOKSBState when disabled
    - LP: #1571691
  * SAUCE: UEFI: Add secure boot and MOK SB State disabled sysctl
    - LP: #1593075

  [ Upstream Kernel Changes ]

  * HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
    - LP: #1579190
  * mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
    - LP: #1581865
    - CVE-2016-3070

linux (3.19.0-64.72) vivid; urgency=low

  [ Luis Henriques ]

  * Release Tracking Bug
    - LP: #1595976

  [ Upstream Kernel Changes ]

  * netfilter: x_tables: validate e->target_offset early
    - LP: #1555338
    - CVE-2016-3134
  * netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob
    size
    - LP: #1555338
    - CVE-2016-3134
  * netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
    - LP: #1555338
    - CVE-2016-3134
  * netfilter: x_tables: don't move to non-existent next rule
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_entry_offsets
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: kill check_entry helper
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: assert minimum target size
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: add compat version of xt_check_entry_offsets
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: check standard target size too
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: validate all offsets and sizes in a rule
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: don't reject valid target size on some
    architectures
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: arp_tables: simplify translate_compat_table args
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: ip_tables: simplify translate_compat_table args
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: ip6_tables: simplify translate_compat_table args
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: xt_compat_match_from_user doesn't need a retval
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: do compat validation via translate_table
    - LP: #1595350
  * netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user
    - LP: #1595350

Date: 2016-06-29 21:01:14.057275+00:00
Changed-By: Ben Romer <benjamin.romer at canonical.com>
Signed-By: Andy Whitcroft <apw at canonical.com>
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux-lts-vivid/3.19.0-65.73~14.04.1
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