[ubuntu/raring-security] chromium-browser 28.0.1500.71-0ubuntu1.13.04.1 (Accepted)

Chris Coulson chris.coulson at canonical.com
Wed Jul 24 14:22:33 UTC 2013


chromium-browser (28.0.1500.71-0ubuntu1.13.04.1) raring-security; urgency=low

  * New release 28.0.1500.71.
  * debian/chromium-browser.install: Include inspector resources in
    chromium-browser package.
  * debian/control: Make new -dbg package for chromedriver.
  * debian/rules:
    - Remove tests for ancient versions of Ubuntu.
    - Return to using no explicity NEON fpu, and instead try to detect at
      runtime NEON caps. This effectively disables NEON, so far.
    - Build and run unit test suite as part of making a package. Abort if
      more than 15 out of ~1000 tests fail.
    - Clean up packaging sanity test that verifies everything we build is
      put into a package.
    - Set relative rpath to libs/ for chromium-browser executable, but . for
      libraries in libs/ ; that makes dpkg-shlibdeps happy and process run.
    - Strip out some ugly logic around keeping only one language in the main
      package, and keeping the contents verifier happy based on the
      architecture.
    - EXPERIMENT: Try not stripping enormous libraries' symbols explicitly.
    - Add more exceptions for packaging contents tests, this time to exclude
      files that are in package but not from the build tree.
    - Be more explicit about what files we set the rpath on.  Get all
      executables. We missed chromedriver before.
    - Only one hardware arch builds the independent files, so in our sanity
      test that we install everything upstream built once and only once in
      packages, we have to consider whether this build didn't even try to
      take and use arch-independent files.  Don't look for some file paths if
      we don't use them.  (Also, if we match too much of what we used, also
      remove matches from the list of created.  This should be better.)
  * debian/patches/arm-neon.patch:
    - Compile in NEON instructions for ARM, even if we can't reliably check for
      whether our CPU is capable of running them yet.  The major problem
      remaining is that the sandbox security wrapper defeats any test of
      /proc/cpuinfo .
  * debian/source/lintian-overrides:
    - Supress warnings about known intentional decisions: Package name, 
      statically linked bundled libraries, setuid root sandbox.
  * debian/chromium-browser.sh.in:
    - Detect at startup the features of the CPU that we might be intersted
      in and export info into the environment.  This is step one of a longer
      workaround for sandbox /proc restrictions.
  * Make a fall-back for when upstream fails to release a Release. Package up
    as best we can from source control.  debian/rules and 
    debian/checkout-orig-source.mk .
  * debian/tests/:
    - Add smoketest to verify that chromium runs.
    - Add a empty webapps test file for notes about what parts of webapps will
      or should be tested.
  * debian/keep-alive.sh.  Quit if disk environment disappears.

Date: 2013-07-18 13:00:36.248160+00:00
Changed-By: Chad Miller <chad.miller at canonical.com>
Signed-By: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson at canonical.com>
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/raring/+source/chromium-browser/28.0.1500.71-0ubuntu1.13.04.1
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