ACK: [SRU][J][PATCH 0/1] CVE-2022-49178

Andrei Gherzan andrei.gherzan at canonical.com
Fri Sep 11 08:53:53 UTC 2026


On 26/09/08 09:17PM, Cengiz Can via kernel-team wrote:
> https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-49178
> 
> [ Impact ]
> 
> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> 
> memstick/mspro_block: fix handling of read-only devices
> 
> Use set_disk_ro to propagate the read-only state to the block layer instead of
> checking for it in ->open and leaking a reference in case of a read-only
> device.
> 
> The mspro_block driver checked for the read-only state in its ->open
> handler and returned early without releasing the reference it had taken,
> leaking a device reference each time a read-only Memory Stick Pro card was
> opened. Repeated opens can exhaust references and interfere with proper
> device teardown.
> 
> [ Fix ]
> 
> jammy/linux: backported from 6dab421bfe06
> 
> The fix uses set_disk_ro() to communicate the read-only state to the block
> layer at disk registration time, removing the flawed check and reference
> leak in ->open. This tree keeps its existing void-style device_add_disk()
> call, as the additional error-handling context from upstream is not present
> here and is unrelated to this change.
> 
> [ Test Plan ]
> 
> Build and boot tested.
> 
> [ Where Problems Could Occur ]
> 
> A bad fix would only affect systems using Memory Stick Pro (MS Pro) media
> through the memstick/mspro_block driver, most notably workflows that mount
> or read write-protected (read-only) MS Pro cards. Systems without such
> hardware, or that never load the mspro_block driver, are not affected.
> 
> [ Other Info ]
> 
> Kybele flow-v11-21-g0f091652. Reference: 7a7bc36d/v1

Acked-by: Andrei Gherzan <andrei.gherzan at canonical.com>

-- 
Andrei Gherzan
gpg: rsa4096/D4D94F67AD0E9640
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