[SRU][J/N/Q][PATCH 0/2] CVE-2025-40215 and CVE-2025-40256
Tim Whisonant
tim.whisonant at canonical.com
Mon Jan 5 22:43:00 UTC 2026
SRU Justification:
[Impact]
xfrm: delete x->tunnel as we delete x
The ipcomp fallback tunnels currently get deleted (from the various
lists and hashtables) as the last user state that needed that fallback
is destroyed (not deleted). If a reference to that user state still
exists, the fallback state will remain on the hashtables/lists,
triggering the WARN in xfrm_state_fini. Because of those remaining
references, the fix in commit f75a2804da39 ("xfrm: destroy xfrm_state
synchronously on net exit path") is not complete.
We recently fixed one such situation in TCP due to defered freeing of
skbs (commit 9b6412e6979f ("tcp: drop secpath at the same time as we
currently drop dst")). This can also happen due to IP reassembly: skbs
with a secpath remain on the reassembly queue until netns
destruction. If we can't guarantee that the queues are flushed by the
time xfrm_state_fini runs, there may still be references to a (user)
xfrm_state, preventing the timely deletion of the corresponding
fallback state.
Instead of chasing each instance of skbs holding a secpath one by one,
this patch fixes the issue directly within xfrm, by deleting the
fallback state as soon as the last user state depending on it has been
deleted. Destruction will still happen when the final reference is
dropped.
A separate lockdep class for the fallback state is required since
we're going to lock x->tunnel while x is locked.
xfrm: also call xfrm_state_delete_tunnel at destroy time for states that were never added
[ Upstream commit 10deb69864840ccf96b00ac2ab3a2055c0c04721 ]
In commit b441cf3f8c4b ("xfrm: delete x->tunnel as we delete x"), I
missed the case where state creation fails between full
initialization (->init_state has been called) and being inserted on
the lists.
In this situation, ->init_state has been called, so for IPcomp
tunnels, the fallback tunnel has been created and added onto the
lists, but the user state never gets added, because we fail before
that. The user state doesn't go through __xfrm_state_delete, so we
don't call xfrm_state_delete_tunnel for those states, and we end up
leaking the FB tunnel.
There are several codepaths affected by this: the add/update paths, in
both net/key and xfrm, and the migrate code (xfrm_migrate,
xfrm_state_migrate). A "proper" rollback of the init_state work would
probably be doable in the add/update code, but for migrate it gets
more complicated as multiple states may be involved.
At some point, the new (not-inserted) state will be destroyed, so call
xfrm_state_delete_tunnel during xfrm_state_gc_destroy. Most states
will have their fallback tunnel cleaned up during __xfrm_state_delete,
which solves the issue that b441cf3f8c4b (and other patches before it)
aimed at. All states (including FB tunnels) will be removed from the
lists once xfrm_state_fini has called flush_work(&xfrm_state_gc_work).
[Fix]
Questing: cherry-picked from upstream (CVE-2025-40256 only)
Noble: applied Jammy patches
Jammy: backported from upstream
Focal: submitted to Forgejo
Bionic: submitted to esm ml
Xenial: submitted to esm ml
Trusty: out of scope (medium CVE)
[Test Plan]
Compile and boot tested.
[Where problems could occur]
The changes affect the core networking transform framework,
specifically the ipcomp fallback tunnel state tracking.
Issues might appear as problems cleaning up tunnel state.
[Notes]
For Questing, only CVE-2025-40256 is addressed as Questing already
contained the fix for CVE-2025-40215.
Sabrina Dubroca (2):
xfrm: delete x->tunnel as we delete x
xfrm: also call xfrm_state_delete_tunnel at destroy time for states
that were never added
include/net/xfrm.h | 1 -
net/ipv4/ipcomp.c | 2 ++
net/ipv6/ipcomp6.c | 2 ++
net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c | 1 -
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
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