[SRU OEM-6.0 8/9] wifi: mac80211: fix crash in beacon protection for P2P-device
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
cascardo at canonical.com
Tue Oct 18 17:43:11 UTC 2022
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg at intel.com>
If beacon protection is active but the beacon cannot be
decrypted or is otherwise malformed, we call the cfg80211
API to report this to userspace, but that uses a netdev
pointer, which isn't present for P2P-Device. Fix this to
call it only conditionally to ensure cfg80211 won't crash
in the case of P2P-Device.
This fixes CVE-2022-42722.
Reported-by: Sönke Huster <shuster at seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de>
Fixes: 9eaf183af741 ("mac80211: Report beacon protection failures to user space")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg at intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit b2d03cabe2b2e150ff5a381731ea0355459be09f)
CVE-2022-42722
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo at canonical.com>
---
net/mac80211/rx.c | 12 +++++++-----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index 45d7e71661e3..211de01bf615 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -1967,10 +1967,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if (mmie_keyidx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS ||
mmie_keyidx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS +
- NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS) {
- cfg80211_rx_unprot_mlme_mgmt(rx->sdata->dev,
- skb->data,
- skb->len);
+ NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS) {
+ if (rx->sdata->dev)
+ cfg80211_rx_unprot_mlme_mgmt(rx->sdata->dev,
+ skb->data,
+ skb->len);
return RX_DROP_MONITOR; /* unexpected BIP keyidx */
}
@@ -2121,7 +2122,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
/* either the frame has been decrypted or will be dropped */
status->flag |= RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED;
- if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_beacon(fc) && result == RX_DROP_UNUSABLE))
+ if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_beacon(fc) && result == RX_DROP_UNUSABLE &&
+ rx->sdata->dev))
cfg80211_rx_unprot_mlme_mgmt(rx->sdata->dev,
skb->data, skb->len);
--
2.34.1
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