[Unstable][PATCH v2 0/3] linux: Staging modules should be unsigned (LP: #1642368)

Juerg Haefliger juerg.haefliger at canonical.com
Mon May 9 14:25:01 UTC 2022


Modules under the drivers/staging hierarchy get little attention when it comes
to vulnerabilities. It is possible that memory mapping tricks that expose
kernel internals would go unnoticed. Therefore, do not sign staging modules so
that they cannot be loaded in a secure boot environment.

[juergh: The above is the original bug that introduced this feature in Xenial.
 We seem to have lost it in Impish probably because of breaking changes in
 Makefile.modinst. So bring it back and while at it:
  - Remove modules that are no longer in the staging area from the list.
  - Add a check that verifies that only listed staging modules are signed.]

v2:
  - Move signature-inclusion file to the debian/ directory to keep the source
    tree clean.
  - Strip signatures from unlisted staging drivers in a build rule rather than
    modifying the upstream Makefile to not sign them.

Juerg Haefliger (3):
  UBUNTU: [Packaging] Move and update signature inclusion list
  UBUNTU: [Packaging] Strip signatures from untrusted staging modules
  UBUNTU: [Packaging] Add module-signature-check

 debian/rules.d/2-binary-arch.mk               | 11 +++
 debian/rules.d/4-checks.mk                    | 10 ++-
 debian/scripts/module-signature-check         | 67 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../staging => debian}/signature-inclusion    |  7 --
 4 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100755 debian/scripts/module-signature-check
 rename {drivers/staging => debian}/signature-inclusion (73%)

-- 
2.32.0




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