ACK: [SRU Bionic/Focal/Impish 0/5] Spectre-BHB followups

[Tim Gardner]

Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner at canonical.com>

On 4/4/22 14:16, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo wrote:
> [Impact]
> The LFENCE mitigation was found out not to be sufficient on AMD systems. And
> unprivileged eBPF was considered in the mitigation status for Spectre v2.
> 
> [Fixes]
> "x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation
> reporting" need to be backported from close upstream stable branches.
> 
> [Potential regression]
> Mitigations may not be applied correctly and changing unprivileged eBPF
> setting may cause surprising effects. Mitigations may be reported incorrectly
> or incompletely.
>   
> Josh Poimboeuf (3):
>    x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2
>      mitigation reporting
>    x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation
>    x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT
> 
> Kim Phillips (2):
>    x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD
>    x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
> 
>   Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst |  6 +-
>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 71 +++++++++++++++----
>   include/linux/bpf.h                           | 11 +++
>   kernel/sysctl.c                               |  8 +++
>   4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 

-- 
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Tim Gardner
Canonical, Inc