[PATCH][SRU][xenial] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: fix nnp subset check failure, when stacking

John Johansen john.johansen at canonical.com
Mon Aug 5 23:31:33 UTC 2019


This is a backport of a fix that landed as part of a larger patch
in 4.17 commit 9fcf78cca1986 ("apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement at nnp")

Domain transitions that add a new profile to the confinement stack
when under NO NEW PRIVS is allowed as it can not expand privileges.

However such transitions are failing due to how/where the subset
test is being applied. Applying the test per profile in the
profile transition and profile_onexec call backs is incorrect as
it disregards the other profiles in the stack so it can not
correctly determine if the old confinement stack is a subset of
the new confinement stack.

Move the test to after the new confinement stack is constructed.

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1839037
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/domain.c | 47 ++++++++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index d9e29b2fdda2..38595ca7e642 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -560,22 +560,6 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	if (!new)
 		goto audit;
 
-	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. if no_new_privs and
-	 * confined and not transitioning to the current domain fail.
-	 *
-	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stritly stacked
-	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
-	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
-	 */
-	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
-	    !profile_unconfined(profile) &&
-	    !aa_label_is_subset(new, &profile->label)) {
-		error = -EPERM;
-		info = "no new privs";
-		nonewprivs = true;
-		perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
-		goto audit;
-	}
 
 	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
 		if (DEBUG_ON) {
@@ -653,22 +637,6 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 		goto audit;
 	}
 
-	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. if no_new_privs and
-	 * confined and not transitioning to the current domain fail.
-	 *
-	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stritly stacked
-	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
-	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
-	 */
-	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
-	    !profile_unconfined(profile) &&
-	    !aa_label_is_subset(onexec, &profile->label)) {
-		error = -EPERM;
-		info = "no new privs";
-		perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
-		goto audit;
-	}
-
 	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
 		if (DEBUG_ON) {
 			dbg_printk("appaarmor: scrubbing environment "
@@ -788,7 +756,20 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		goto done;
 	}
 
-	/* TODO: Add ns level no_new_privs subset test */
+	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. If no_new_privs and
+	 * confined ensure the transition is to confinement that is subset
+	 * of the confinement when the task entered no new privs.
+	 *
+	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked
+	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
+	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
+	 */
+	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
+	    !unconfined(label) && !aa_label_is_subset(new, label)) {
+		error = -EPERM;
+		info = "no new privs";
+		goto audit;
+	}
 
 	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
 		/* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
-- 
2.17.1




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