[CVE-2014-9904][Trusty] ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check

Luis Henriques luis.henriques at canonical.com
Tue Sep 27 10:54:38 UTC 2016


From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter at oracle.com>

I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.

The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer().  We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.

Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter at oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai at suse.de>
CVE-2014-9904
(cherry picked from commit 6217e5ede23285ddfee10d2e4ba0cc2d4c046205)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques at canonical.com>
---
 sound/core/compress_offload.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sound/core/compress_offload.c b/sound/core/compress_offload.c
index 4983f30cf2c2..7305a5e394cf 100644
--- a/sound/core/compress_offload.c
+++ b/sound/core/compress_offload.c
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static int snd_compress_check_input(struct snd_compr_params *params)
 {
 	/* first let's check the buffer parameter's */
 	if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
-			params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
+	    params->buffer.fragments > INT_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* now codec parameters */




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