[PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 19/40] nf_conntrack: avoid kernel pointer value leak in slab name

Kamal Mostafa kamal at canonical.com
Wed May 25 17:30:22 UTC 2016


3.19.8-ckt22 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

---8<------------------------------------------------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>

commit 31b0b385f69d8d5491a4bca288e25e63f1d945d0 upstream.

The slab name ends up being visible in the directory structure under
/sys, and even if you don't have access rights to the file you can see
the filenames.

Just use a 64-bit counter instead of the pointer to the 'net' structure
to generate a unique name.

This code will go away in 4.7 when the conntrack code moves to a single
kmemcache, but this is the backportable simple solution to avoiding
leaking kernel pointers to user space.

Fixes: 5b3501faa874 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: per netns nf_conntrack_cachep")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet at gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal at canonical.com>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
index 46d1b26..0ab748b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
@@ -1736,6 +1736,7 @@ void nf_conntrack_init_end(void)
 
 int nf_conntrack_init_net(struct net *net)
 {
+	static atomic64_t unique_id;
 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
 	int cpu;
 
@@ -1759,7 +1760,8 @@ int nf_conntrack_init_net(struct net *net)
 	if (!net->ct.stat)
 		goto err_pcpu_lists;
 
-	net->ct.slabname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "nf_conntrack_%p", net);
+	net->ct.slabname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "nf_conntrack_%llu",
+				(u64)atomic64_inc_return(&unique_id));
 	if (!net->ct.slabname)
 		goto err_slabname;
 
-- 
2.7.4





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