[CVE-2016-9793][trysty, vivid, xenial, yakkety] net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE

Luis Henriques luis.henriques at canonical.com
Mon Dec 12 10:36:17 UTC 2016

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet at google.com>

CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...

Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.

This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.

Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet at google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl at google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques at canonical.com>
 net/core/sock.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 5dc8a067a6bb..d38777814e77 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
 		val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_wmem_max);
 		sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_SNDBUF_LOCK;
-		sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);
+		sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);
 		/* Wake up sending tasks if we upped the value. */
@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ set_rcvbuf:
 		 * returning the value we actually used in getsockopt
 		 * is the most desirable behavior.
-		sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);
+		sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);

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