[3.16.y-ckt stable] Patch "ARC: signal handling robustify" has been added to staging queue

Luis Henriques luis.henriques at canonical.com
Tue May 12 10:32:19 UTC 2015


This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled

    ARC: signal handling robustify

to the linux-3.16.y-queue branch of the 3.16.y-ckt extended stable tree 
which can be found at:

    http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git/ubuntu/linux.git/log/?h=linux-3.16.y-queue

This patch is scheduled to be released in version 3.16.7-ckt12.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please 
reply to this email.

For more information about the 3.16.y-ckt tree, see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable

Thanks.
-Luis

------

>From 4a5abf78cb45911885f541489042436ef40c9778 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vineet Gupta <vgupta at synopsys.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 11:14:41 +0530
Subject: ARC: signal handling robustify

commit e4140819dadc3624accac8294881bca8a3cba4ed upstream.

A malicious signal handler / restorer can DOS the system by fudging the
user regs saved on stack, causing weird things such as sigreturn returning
to user mode PC but cpu state still being kernel mode....

Ensure that in sigreturn path status32 always has U bit; any other bogosity
(gargbage PC etc) will be taken care of by normal user mode exceptions mechanisms.

Reproducer signal handler:

    void handle_sig(int signo, siginfo_t *info, void *context)
    {
	ucontext_t *uc = context;
	struct user_regs_struct *regs = &(uc->uc_mcontext.regs);

	regs->scratch.status32 = 0;
    }

Before the fix, kernel would go off to weeds like below:

    --------->8-----------
    [ARCLinux]$ ./signal-test
    Path: /signal-test
    CPU: 0 PID: 61 Comm: signal-test Not tainted 4.0.0-rc5+ #65
    task: 8f177880 ti: 5ffe6000 task.ti: 8f15c000

    [ECR   ]: 0x00220200 => Invalid Write @ 0x00000010 by insn @ 0x00010698
    [EFA   ]: 0x00000010
    [BLINK ]: 0x2007c1ee
    [ERET  ]: 0x10698
    [STAT32]: 0x00000000 :                                   <--------
    BTA: 0x00010680	 SP: 0x5ffe7e48	 FP: 0x00000000
    LPS: 0x20003c6c	LPE: 0x20003c70	LPC: 0x00000000
    ...
    --------->8-----------

Reported-by: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin at synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta at synopsys.com>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: used Vineet's backport to 3.14 ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques at canonical.com>
---
 arch/arc/kernel/signal.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arc/kernel/signal.c
index d68b410595c8..a0c63fc48457 100644
--- a/arch/arc/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arc/kernel/signal.c
@@ -131,6 +131,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	/* Don't restart from sigreturn */
 	syscall_wont_restart(regs);

+	/*
+	 * Ensure that sigreturn always returns to user mode (in case the
+	 * regs saved on user stack got fudged between save and sigreturn)
+	 * Otherwise it is easy to panic the kernel with a custom
+	 * signal handler and/or restorer which clobberes the status32/ret
+	 * to return to a bogus location in kernel mode.
+	 */
+	regs->status32 |= STATUS_U_MASK;
+
 	return regs->r0;

 badframe:
@@ -234,8 +243,11 @@ setup_rt_frame(int signo, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,

 	/*
 	 * handler returns using sigreturn stub provided already by userpsace
+	 * If not, nuke the process right away
 	 */
-	BUG_ON(!(ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER));
+	if(!(ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER))
+		return 1;
+
 	regs->blink = (unsigned long)ka->sa.sa_restorer;

 	/* User Stack for signal handler will be above the frame just carved */
@@ -302,12 +314,12 @@ handle_signal(unsigned long sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
 	      struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	sigset_t *oldset = sigmask_to_save();
-	int ret;
+	int failed;

 	/* Set up the stack frame */
-	ret = setup_rt_frame(sig, ka, info, oldset, regs);
+	failed = setup_rt_frame(sig, ka, info, oldset, regs);

-	if (ret)
+	if (failed)
 		force_sigsegv(sig, current);
 	else
 		signal_delivered(sig, info, ka, regs, 0);




More information about the kernel-team mailing list