[patch][trusty] Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: fix unix domain sockets to be mediated on connection"

[John Johansen]

This reverts commit 059c1f0963799ae6ac778863a82ba117e8041b54.

http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1270215

Precise policy was not setup to deal with mediation of unix domain
sockets at connection, as such this patch causes policy failures on
precise. This bug could be fixed by updating policy but that would
still cause custom policy to break, so as with lts-saucy this feature
should be removed for lts-trusty on precise.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen at canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/lsm.c | 48 ++++++++++++------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b83e92b..b320317 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -787,29 +787,10 @@ do { \
 // sk->sk_socket is NULL when orphaned/being shutdown
 // socket->sk set on graft, and sock_init_data if (socket exists)
 
-#define UNIX_ANONYMOUS(U) (!unix_sk(U)->addr)
-#define UNIX_FS(U) (!UNIX_ANONYMOUS(U) && unix_sk(U)->addr->name->sun_path[0])
-
-static int unix_fs_perm(int op, struct aa_label *label, struct sock *sk,
-			u32 mask)
-{
-	if (!unconfined(label) && UNIX_FS(sk)) {
-		struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
-
-		/* the sunpath may not be valid for this ns so use the path */
-		struct path_cond cond = { u->path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
-					  u->path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
-		};
-
-		return aa_path_perm(op, label, &u->path, 0, mask, &cond);
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * apparmor_unix_stream_connect - check perms before making unix domain conn
  *
- * other is locked when this hook is called
+ * only used for alt unix socket namespace ???
  */
 static int apparmor_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
 					struct sock *newsk)
@@ -817,16 +798,16 @@ static int apparmor_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
 	struct aa_sk_cxt *sock_cxt = SK_CXT(sock);
 	struct aa_sk_cxt *other_cxt = SK_CXT(other);
 	struct aa_sk_cxt *new_cxt = SK_CXT(newsk);
-	struct aa_label *label = __aa_get_current_label();
 
-	int error = unix_fs_perm(OP_CONNECT, label, other,
-				 MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE);
-	__aa_put_current_label(label);
 
-	if (error)
+#if 0
+	if (!perms to connect sock to other)
+
 		return error;
+#endif
 
-	/* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */
+// ??? label not updated after connection??? it would be good if the label
+// was updated as the task labeling is updated
 	if (new_cxt->peer) {
 		//printk("%s: new_cxt->peer\n", __FUNCTION__);
 		aa_put_label(new_cxt->peer);
@@ -849,21 +830,16 @@ static int apparmor_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
 /**
  * apparmor_unix_may_send - check perms before conn or sending unix dgrams
  *
- * other is locked when this hook is called
+ * Only used for alt unix socket namespace ????
  */
 static int apparmor_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_cxt *other_cxt = SK_CXT(other->sk);
-	struct aa_label *label = __aa_get_current_label();
-	int e, error ;
+  //  ??? how do these play in with regular perm checks, conditional?
 
-	error = unix_fs_perm(OP_SENDMSG, label, other->sk, MAY_WRITE);
-	e = unix_fs_perm(OP_SENDMSG, other_cxt->label, sock->sk, MAY_READ);
-	if (e)
-		error = e;
-	__aa_put_current_label(label);
+//	print_sk(sock->sk);
+//	print_sk(other->sk);
 
-	return error;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
-- 
1.8.3.2