[ 3.5.y.z extended stable ] Patch "random: fix accounting race condition with lockless irq" has been added to staging queue
Luis Henriques
luis.henriques at canonical.com
Tue May 28 09:51:44 UTC 2013
This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled
random: fix accounting race condition with lockless irq
to the linux-3.5.y-queue branch of the 3.5.y.z extended stable tree
which can be found at:
http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git?p=ubuntu/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/linux-3.5.y-queue
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please
reply to this email.
For more information about the 3.5.y.z tree, see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable
Thanks.
-Luis
------
>From 5a32e8908b3f37c637d49c3ccb150814f278df2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina at suse.cz>
Date: Fri, 24 May 2013 15:55:33 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] random: fix accounting race condition with lockless irq
entropy_count update
commit 10b3a32d292c21ea5b3ad5ca5975e88bb20b8d68 upstream.
Commit 902c098a3663 ("random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt
path") turned IRQ path from being spinlock protected into lockless
cmpxchg-retry update.
That commit removed r->lock serialization between crediting entropy bits
from IRQ context and accounting when extracting entropy on userspace
read path, but didn't turn the r->entropy_count reads/updates in
account() to use cmpxchg as well.
It has been observed, that under certain circumstances this leads to
read() on /dev/urandom to return 0 (EOF), as r->entropy_count gets
corrupted and becomes negative, which in turn results in propagating 0
all the way from account() to the actual read() call.
Convert the accounting code to be the proper lockless counterpart of
what has been partially done by 902c098a3663.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina at suse.cz>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso at mit.edu>
Cc: Greg KH <greg at kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques at canonical.com>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 91abbc4..395d2e8 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -868,16 +868,24 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
if (r->entropy_count / 8 < min + reserved) {
nbytes = 0;
} else {
+ int entropy_count, orig;
+retry:
+ entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
/* If limited, never pull more than available */
- if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= r->entropy_count / 8)
- nbytes = r->entropy_count/8 - reserved;
-
- if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved)
- r->entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
- else
- r->entropy_count = reserved;
+ if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= entropy_count / 8)
+ nbytes = entropy_count/8 - reserved;
+
+ if (entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved) {
+ entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
+ if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+ goto retry;
+ } else {
+ entropy_count = reserved;
+ if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+ goto retry;
+ }
- if (r->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
+ if (entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
wakeup_write = 1;
}
--
1.8.1.2
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