[ 3.5.y.z extended stable ] Patch "NFS: Fix access to suid/sgid executables" has been added to staging queue
Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski
herton.krzesinski at canonical.com
Tue Jan 15 22:21:16 UTC 2013
This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled
NFS: Fix access to suid/sgid executables
to the linux-3.5.y-queue branch of the 3.5.y.z extended stable tree
which can be found at:
http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git?p=ubuntu/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/linux-3.5.y-queue
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please
reply to this email.
For more information about the 3.5.y.z tree, see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable
Thanks.
-Herton
------
>From 79706dab7714883f1c95447e449d9370796eeac0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Weston Andros Adamson <dros at netapp.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2013 16:42:29 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] NFS: Fix access to suid/sgid executables
commit f8d9a897d4384b77f13781ea813156568f68b83e upstream.
nfs_open_permission_mask() should only check MAY_EXEC for files that
are opened with __FMODE_EXEC.
Also fix NFSv4 access-in-open path in a similar way -- openflags must be
used because fmode will not always have FMODE_EXEC set.
This patch fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49101
Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros at netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust at netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski at canonical.com>
---
fs/nfs/dir.c | 16 ++++++++++------
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c
index 9ad08e2..ce709c5 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
@@ -2276,12 +2276,16 @@ static int nfs_open_permission_mask(int openflags)
{
int mask = 0;
- if ((openflags & O_ACCMODE) != O_WRONLY)
- mask |= MAY_READ;
- if ((openflags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
- mask |= MAY_WRITE;
- if (openflags & __FMODE_EXEC)
- mask |= MAY_EXEC;
+ if (openflags & __FMODE_EXEC) {
+ /* ONLY check exec rights */
+ mask = MAY_EXEC;
+ } else {
+ if ((openflags & O_ACCMODE) != O_WRONLY)
+ mask |= MAY_READ;
+ if ((openflags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
+ mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+ }
+
return mask;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index fa3fbd1..f1a4bf7 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -1655,7 +1655,8 @@ static int _nfs4_recover_proc_open(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
static int nfs4_opendata_access(struct rpc_cred *cred,
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata,
- struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t fmode)
+ struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t fmode,
+ int openflags)
{
struct nfs_access_entry cache;
u32 mask;
@@ -1667,11 +1668,14 @@ static int nfs4_opendata_access(struct rpc_cred *cred,
mask = 0;
/* don't check MAY_WRITE - a newly created file may not have
- * write mode bits, but POSIX allows the creating process to write */
- if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
- mask |= MAY_READ;
- if (fmode & FMODE_EXEC)
- mask |= MAY_EXEC;
+ * write mode bits, but POSIX allows the creating process to write.
+ * use openflags to check for exec, because fmode won't
+ * always have FMODE_EXEC set when file open for exec. */
+ if (openflags & __FMODE_EXEC) {
+ /* ONLY check for exec rights */
+ mask = MAY_EXEC;
+ } else if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
+ mask = MAY_READ;
cache.cred = cred;
cache.jiffies = jiffies;
@@ -1902,7 +1906,7 @@ static int _nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir,
if (server->caps & NFS_CAP_POSIX_LOCK)
set_bit(NFS_STATE_POSIX_LOCKS, &state->flags);
- status = nfs4_opendata_access(cred, opendata, state, fmode);
+ status = nfs4_opendata_access(cred, opendata, state, fmode, flags);
if (status != 0)
goto err_opendata_put;
--
1.7.9.5
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