[ 3.5.yuz extended stable ] Patch "nfsd4: don't pin clientids to pseudoflavors" has been added to staging queue

Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski herton.krzesinski at canonical.com
Thu Nov 15 06:56:20 UTC 2012

This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled

    nfsd4: don't pin clientids to pseudoflavors

to the linux-3.5.y-queue branch of the 3.5.yuz extended stable tree 
which can be found at:


If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please 
reply to this email.

For more information about the 3.5.yuz tree, see



>From a72388a076914cca308dbf0788880e962467f62e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields at redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2012 12:48:30 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] nfsd4: don't pin clientids to pseudoflavors

commit 68eb35081e297b37db49d854cda144c6a3397699 upstream.

I added cr_flavor to the data compared in same_creds without any
justification, in d5497fc693a446ce9100fcf4117c3f795ddfd0d2 "nfsd4: move
rq_flavor into svc_cred".

Recent client changes then started making

	mount -osec=krb5 server:/export /mnt/
	echo "hello" >/mnt/TMP
	umount /mnt/
	mount -osec=krb5i server:/export /mnt/
	echo "hello" >/mnt/TMP

to fail due to a clid_inuse on the second open.

Mounting sequentially like this with different flavors probably isn't
that common outside artificial tests.  Also, the real bug here may be
that the server isn't just destroying the former clientid in this case
(because it isn't good enough at recognizing when the old state is
gone).  But it prompted some discussion and a look back at the spec, and
I think the check was probably wrong.  Fix and document.

Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski at canonical.com>
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c |   18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
index be324aa..02ac082 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -1215,10 +1215,26 @@ static bool groups_equal(struct group_info *g1, struct group_info *g2)
 	return true;

+ * RFC 3530 language requires clid_inuse be returned when the
+ * "principal" associated with a requests differs from that previously
+ * used.  We use uid, gid's, and gss principal string as our best
+ * approximation.  We also don't want to allow non-gss use of a client
+ * established using gss: in theory cr_principal should catch that
+ * change, but in practice cr_principal can be null even in the gss case
+ * since gssd doesn't always pass down a principal string.
+ */
+static bool is_gss_cred(struct svc_cred *cr)
+	/* Is cr_flavor one of the gss "pseudoflavors"?: */
+	return (cr->cr_flavor > RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR);
 static bool
 same_creds(struct svc_cred *cr1, struct svc_cred *cr2)
-	if ((cr1->cr_flavor != cr2->cr_flavor)
+	if ((is_gss_cred(cr1) != is_gss_cred(cr2))
 		|| (cr1->cr_uid != cr2->cr_uid)
 		|| (cr1->cr_gid != cr2->cr_gid)
 		|| !groups_equal(cr1->cr_group_info, cr2->cr_group_info))

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