Natty SRU: eCryptfs: Clear ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE flag during truncate

Leann Ogasawara leann.ogasawara at canonical.com
Mon Oct 10 14:16:59 UTC 2011


On Mon, 2011-10-10 at 14:46 +0100, Tim Gardner wrote:
> On 10/10/2011 02:42 PM, Leann Ogasawara wrote:
> > On Sun, 2011-10-09 at 05:12 -0600, Tim Gardner wrote:
> >>  From 27ed7cb2b00512e81016419715c1d9b6794b06ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> >> From: Tyler Hicks<tyhicks at canonical.com>
> >> Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2011 15:54:26 -0500
> >> Subject: [PATCH] eCryptfs: Clear ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE flag during truncate
> >>
> >> BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/745836
> >>
> >> The ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE crypt_stat flag is set upon creation of a new
> >> eCryptfs file. When the flag is set, eCryptfs reads directly from the
> >> lower filesystem when bringing a page up to date. This means that no
> >> offset translation (for the eCryptfs file metadata in the lower file)
> >> and no decryption is performed. The flag is cleared just before the
> >> first write is completed (at the beginning of ecryptfs_write_begin()).
> >>
> >> It was discovered that if a new file was created and then extended with
> >> truncate, the ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE flag was not cleared. If pages
> >> corresponding to this file are ever reclaimed, any subsequent reads
> >> would result in userspace seeing eCryptfs file metadata and encrypted
> >> file contents instead of the expected decrypted file contents.
> >>
> >> Data corruption is possible if the file is written to before the
> >> eCryptfs directory is unmounted. The data written will be copied into
> >> pages which have been read directly from the lower file rather than
> >> zeroed pages, as would be expected after extending the file with
> >> truncate.
> >>
> >> This flag, and the functionality that used it, was removed in upstream
> >> kernels in 2.6.39 with the following commits:
> >>
> >> bd4f0fe8bb7c73c738e1e11bc90d6e2cf9c6e20e
> >> fed8859b3ab94274c986cbdf7d27130e0545f02c
> >
> > Is there a reason we're not just cherry-picking the upstream patches?
> > And so I would assume this patch should be marked as SAUCE?
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Leann
> >
> 
> Yeah, 'UBUNTU: SAUCE:' for sure. Tyler said in the LP report that 
> backporting those 2 commits was getting too involved and complicated. 
> Given the simplicity of his ultimate solution I thought the backport 
> seemed better.

Hrm, those two patches appear to cherry-pick cleanly for me, although I
could be missing other external factors.  Reading the bug report it
sounds like Tyler originally thought this was fixed with upstream commit
3b06b3ebf44170c90c893c6c80916db6e922b9f2 and it was that commit which
was problematic to backport (see comment #85).  It's in the following
comment #86 that he identifies the actual fix being commits bd4f0fe8 and
fed8859b.

Regardless, the SAUCE patch looks fine to me.  It's straightforward and
tested.  I was just more curious as to why we don't just cherry-pick the
upstream patches.  I've CC'd Tyler to get his reasoning.

Thanks,
Leann





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