[PATCH 6/6] ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace CVE-2011-1172

paolo.pisati at canonical.com paolo.pisati at canonical.com
Mon Jul 4 16:27:38 UTC 2011

From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon at openwall.com>

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/801483

commit upstream 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54

Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe

The first bug was introduced before the git epoch;  the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1);  the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1).  To trigger the bug one should have


Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon at openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber at trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati at canonical.com>
 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c |    2 ++
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index acaba15..e02284a 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -1047,6 +1047,7 @@ do_replace(void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
 	if (!newinfo)
@@ -1313,6 +1314,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
 			ret = -EFAULT;
+		rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;
 			target = 1;

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