[PATCH 3/6] netfilter: ip_tables: fix infoleak to userspace CVE-2011-1171

[paolo.pisati at canonical.com]

From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon at openwall.com>

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/801482

commit upstream 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a

Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the
second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1).  To trigger the bug
one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN.

CVE-2011-1171

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon at openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber at trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati at canonical.com>
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c |    3 +++
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index b9b189c..9b52e88 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -1332,6 +1332,7 @@ do_replace(void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
 	if (!newinfo)
@@ -1873,6 +1874,7 @@ compat_do_replace(void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
 	if (!newinfo)
@@ -2101,6 +2103,7 @@ do_ipt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			break;
 		}
+		rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;
 
 		if (cmd == IPT_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
 			target = 1;
-- 
1.7.4.1