[PATCH] UBUNTU: SAUCE: kernel: make /proc/kallsyms mode 400 to reduce ease of attacking

[Kees Cook]

Making /proc/kallsyms readable only for root makes it harder
for attackers to write generic kernel exploits by removing
one source of knowledge where things are in the kernel.

This is the second submit, discussion happened on this on first submit
and mostly concerned that this is just one hole of the sieve ... but
one of the bigger ones.

Changing the permissions of at least System.map and vmlinux is
also required to fix the same set, but a packaging issue.

Target of this starter patch and follow ups is removing any kind of
kernel space address information leak from the kernel.

Ciao, Marcus

[not upstream because some old sysklog daemons have a bug with this]

OriginalAuthor: Marcus Meissner <meissner at suse.de>

Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <meissner at suse.de>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj at kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo at kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj at chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook at canonical.com>
---
 kernel/kallsyms.c |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/kallsyms.c b/kernel/kallsyms.c
index 6f6d091..a8db257 100644
--- a/kernel/kallsyms.c
+++ b/kernel/kallsyms.c
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static const struct file_operations kallsyms_operations = {
 
 static int __init kallsyms_init(void)
 {
-	proc_create("kallsyms", 0444, NULL, &kallsyms_operations);
+	proc_create("kallsyms", 0400, NULL, &kallsyms_operations);
 	return 0;
 }
 device_initcall(kallsyms_init);
-- 
1.7.2.3


-- 
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team