[Bug 2064319] [NEW] Power guest secure boot with key management: GRUB2 portion

[bugproxy]

Public bug reported:

Covering the GRUB2 portion:

Feature:

This feature comprises PowerVM LPAR guest OS kernel verification using
static keys to extend the chain of trust from partition firmware to the
OS kernel.  GRUB and the host OS kernel are signed with 2 separate
public key pairs.  Partition firmware includes the the public
verification key for GRUB in its build and uses it to verify GRUB.  GRUB
includes the public verification key for the OS kernel in its build and
uses it to verify the OS kernel image

Test case:

If secure boot is switched off, any GRUB and kernel boots.
If secure boot is switched on:
  - Properly signed GRUB boots.
  - Improperly signed GRUB does not boot.
  - Tampered signed GRUB does not boot.
  - Properly signed kernels boot.
  - Improperly signed kernels do not boot.
  - Tampered signed kernels do not boot.
TPM PCRs are extended roughly following the TCG PC Client and UEFI specs as they apply to POWER.

** Affects: grub2 (Ubuntu)
     Importance: Undecided
     Assignee: Ubuntu on IBM Power Systems Bug Triage (ubuntu-power-triage)
         Status: New


** Tags: architecture-ppc64le bugnameltc-205841 severity-critical targetmilestone-inin2404

** Tags added: architecture-ppc64le bugnameltc-205841 severity-critical
targetmilestone-inin2404

** Changed in: ubuntu
     Assignee: (unassigned) => Ubuntu on IBM Power Systems Bug Triage (ubuntu-power-triage)

** Package changed: ubuntu => grub2 (Ubuntu)

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2064319

Title:
  Power guest secure boot with key management: GRUB2 portion

Status in grub2 package in Ubuntu:
  New

Bug description:
  Covering the GRUB2 portion:

  Feature:

  This feature comprises PowerVM LPAR guest OS kernel verification using
  static keys to extend the chain of trust from partition firmware to
  the OS kernel.  GRUB and the host OS kernel are signed with 2 separate
  public key pairs.  Partition firmware includes the the public
  verification key for GRUB in its build and uses it to verify GRUB.
  GRUB includes the public verification key for the OS kernel in its
  build and uses it to verify the OS kernel image

  Test case:

  If secure boot is switched off, any GRUB and kernel boots.
  If secure boot is switched on:
    - Properly signed GRUB boots.
    - Improperly signed GRUB does not boot.
    - Tampered signed GRUB does not boot.
    - Properly signed kernels boot.
    - Improperly signed kernels do not boot.
    - Tampered signed kernels do not boot.
  TPM PCRs are extended roughly following the TCG PC Client and UEFI specs as they apply to POWER.

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