[Bug 1978351] Re: MITM vector: ifupdown puts .domains TLD in resolv.conf

[Seth Arnold]

We were asked privately if this should receive a CVE. I'll copy my reply
here:

In this case I don't believe a CVE is appropriate:

- DNS is typically plain-text unauthenticated

- DNS cache poisoning can be insanely easy if poor-quality DNS 
  recursors are in use

- DNS cache poisoning is possible even if high-quality DNS recursors 
  are in use

- DNSSEC can provide authentication of DNS results; end user sites can 
  use a validating recursor to ensure that only authenticated results 
  are delivered to applications

- Applications should be taking steps such as TLS or end-to-end data
  authenticity checks regardless of DNS authentication

Thanks

-- 
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Foundations Bugs, which is subscribed to ifupdown in Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1978351

Title:
  MITM vector: ifupdown puts .domains TLD in resolv.conf

Status in ifupdown package in Ubuntu:
  Confirmed

Bug description:
  The bug described in
  https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/ifupdown/+bug/1907878?comments=all
  is a security vulnerability because DNS names that would normally fail
  are now attempted as "foo.domains".

  ".domains" is a real TLD, with the registrar "Donuts, Inc." based in Bellvue, WA.
  "google.com.domains" is registered, for example. So is "test.domains".

  For users with ifupdown, any Internet request (especially that does
  not involve some cryptographic payload and destination signature
  verification) is potentially sending packets to an unintended
  audience. It's impossible to say, but likely, that malicious
  registrants are squatting sensitive and common names in the .domains
  TLD.

  The ifupdown package is still used by some cloud providers that have not adopted netplan.
  This vulnerability affects 22.04 and potentially other releases.

  This issue has not been corrected in 0.8.36+nmu1ubuntu4.

  With 0.8.36+nmu1ubuntu3 and after an update to 0.8.36+nmu1ubuntu4, the
  resolv.conf looks like the following (which is vulnerable to mitm
  attacks):

  ```
  root at foo:~# cat /etc/resolv.conf
  # This is /run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf managed by man:systemd-resolved(8).
  # Do not edit.
  #
  # This file might be symlinked as /etc/resolv.conf. If you're looking at
  # /etc/resolv.conf and seeing this text, you have followed the symlink.
  #
  # This is a dynamic resolv.conf file for connecting local clients to the
  # internal DNS stub resolver of systemd-resolved. This file lists all
  # configured search domains.
  #
  # Run "resolvectl status" to see details about the uplink DNS servers
  # currently in use.
  #
  # Third party programs should typically not access this file directly, but only
  # through the symlink at /etc/resolv.conf. To manage man:resolv.conf(5) in a
  # different way, replace this symlink by a static file or a different symlink.
  #
  # See man:systemd-resolved.service(8) for details about the supported modes of
  # operation for /etc/resolv.conf.

  nameserver 127.0.0.53
  options edns0 trust-ad
  search DOMAINS
  ```

To manage notifications about this bug go to:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/ifupdown/+bug/1978351/+subscriptions