[Bug 1098299] [NEW] entropy pool should be seeded earlier in boot process

Marc Deslauriers marc.deslauriers at canonical.com
Thu Jan 10 19:25:47 UTC 2013


*** This bug is a security vulnerability ***

Public security bug reported:

Currently, the entropy pool is seeded by /etc/init.d/urandom. This
should be done earlier in the boot process by an upstart job, and should
be done before the ssh daemon is started.

Although the ssh keys are generated on package install, openssh uses
openssl's PRNG which is seeded on boot for ephemeral keys.

See https://factorable.net/weakkeys12.extended.pdf for more information.

** Affects: openssh (Ubuntu)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: New

** Affects: sysvinit (Ubuntu)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: New

** Also affects: openssh (Ubuntu)
   Importance: Undecided
       Status: New

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1098299

Title:
  entropy pool should be seeded earlier in boot process

Status in “openssh” package in Ubuntu:
  New
Status in “sysvinit” package in Ubuntu:
  New

Bug description:
  Currently, the entropy pool is seeded by /etc/init.d/urandom. This
  should be done earlier in the boot process by an upstart job, and
  should be done before the ssh daemon is started.

  Although the ssh keys are generated on package install, openssh uses
  openssl's PRNG which is seeded on boot for ephemeral keys.

  See https://factorable.net/weakkeys12.extended.pdf for more
  information.

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