[Bug 1031301] Re: Exploit for unpatched CVE reported in wild.
Marc Deslauriers
marc.deslauriers at canonical.com
Fri Aug 3 13:46:39 UTC 2012
** Visibility changed to: Public
** This bug is no longer flagged as a security vulnerability
** CVE added: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=2012-3404
** CVE added: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=2012-3405
** CVE added: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=2012-3406
** Also affects: glibc (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: eglibc (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Confirmed
** Changed in: glibc (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Confirmed
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1031301
Title:
Exploit for unpatched CVE reported in wild.
Status in “eglibc” package in Ubuntu:
Confirmed
Status in “glibc” package in Ubuntu:
Confirmed
Bug description:
CVEs are as follows:
CVE-2012-3404
CVE-2012-3405
CVE-2012-3406
lsb_release -rd
Description: Ubuntu 10.04.3 LTS
Release: 10.04
Package: libc6 (2.11.1-0ubuntu7.10)
Details of the bugs are here upstream:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/07/11/17
We received reports from a colleague at another University that they
have suffered a root compromise as a result of one of these CVEs,
which I notice do not appear to be fixed yet in Ubuntu. They are
running Scientific Linux 6 rather than Ubuntu, so can't be directly
compared
Debian appear to have fixes out for 2 of the 3 CVEs
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=681473
They considered the security risk low, but I have reports of exploits
in the wild.
The details I have so far from my colleague are as follows:
09:49 < DaveAG> Was it RHSA-2012:1098-1 you reckon bit you?
09:49 < colleague> erm, one of CVE-2012-3404, CVE-2012-3405, CVE-2012-3406
09:49 < colleague> I don't have an RHSA number to hand since this is SL
09:50 < DaveAG> Yeah, that RHSA lists those 3 CVEs
09:51 < colleague> Announced on the 18th July, we got done on 26th, that's scarily quick
09:52 < colleague> There must be an exploit specifically related to use of /bin/mount
09:53 < colleague> Lovely that with auditd running we immediately were able to spot which suid had been used to get root
09:53 < colleague> and the lack of command line arguments to the command meant it had to be done using the environment to change the way the output was formatted
09:57 < colleague> oh, and blocking the loading of kernel modules helped a lot
09:57 < colleague> It forced the attacker into trying something much more difficult which crashed the kernel.
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