ssh: let password override keys?

Martin Pool mbp at canonical.com
Thu Oct 5 00:25:56 BST 2006


On 04/10/2006, at 14:56 , John Arbash Meinel wrote:

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> Robey Pointer wrote:
>> I found this message while trying to clear out my mailbox.  (Sorry it
>> got lost for so long.)  I think he's suggesting that if a password is
>> given in the sftp:// url, it should be tried before local .ssh/  
>> private
>> keys are tried.
>>
>> Sounds reasonable to me.  Does anyone have an objection?  If not,  
>> I'll
>> submit a patch.
>
> We are unable to pass passwords to an ssh subprocess. So if there is a
> 'ssh' program available, we don't support the password portion of
> sftp://user:password@host/'.
>
>
> passing in a ":password" is generally not recommended, since it starts
> showing up in the .*history files and in the output of 'ps', etc.
>
> So, in general, I think we want to get away from having people use
> passwords in their urls. That said, it is reasonable that if the
> password does exist, then it should be used before the agent is asked.

I agree.  I think it'd be reasonable if

  - If we're using a non-paramiko ssh vendor, the user should get a  
warning that
    the password can't be passed through.  (There should perhaps be a  
method on
    the vendor class that tells whether this can be supported.)  This  
should indicate
    that people need to install paramiko and/or configure bzr to use it.

  - Probably we should give a warning "warning: supplying a password  
in a
    url is a security hazard."

-- 
Martin







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