[apparmor] RFC: draft proposal for enabling AppArmor by default in Debian
Christian Boltz
apparmor at cboltz.de
Fri Aug 4 18:46:45 UTC 2017
Hello,
Am Freitag, 4. August 2017, 14:07:17 CEST schrieb Simon McVittie:
> On Thu, 03 Aug 2017 at 17:20:20 -0400, intrigeri wrote:
> > Hi Debian AppArmor team, upstream AppArmor people, people who
> > volunteered to review this text, a few maintainers of packages that
> > include AppArmor policy, and some innocent bystanders!
>
> You have presented the case for enabling AppArmor well, so here is the
> devil's-advocate position: issues with doing so.
>
> > AppArmor confines programs according to a set of rules that specify
> > what operations a given program can access, e.g. it can prevent your
> > PDF reader and video player from accessing your GnuPG secrets keys
> > and executing arbitrary code. This proactive approach helps protect
> > the system against both known and unknown vulnerabilities.
>
> Does it, though? To judge the value of AppArmor, I don't think it's
> enough to know how many wrong denials we have (functionality being
> broken by AppArmor): we should also understand how many attacks would
> have been mitigated or prevented by it.
Wrong distribution, but still - it prevented exploiting Sambacry aka
CVE-2017-7494 on openSUSE :-) - https://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2017-05/msg00067.html
(BTW: openSUSE has a nice script that updates the samba profile based on
the configured shares which helped a lot to reduce complaints about the
Samba AppArmor profile.)
Another practical example is Dirtycow - I played with two of the sample
exploits, and AppArmor was able to keep that cow clean ;-)
> My experience has been that updates to lower-level libraries like SDL
> and udev frequently cause me to have to update my profiles, even
> without code changes to what I actually maintain. If they were in
> enforcing mode, functionality would presumably have been lost.
Just curious - can you give some examples (especially the needed profile
changes) for this?
> Games are pretty much the perfect example of something that should
> have AppArmor profiles - their legitimate interactions with user files
> are minimal, and I like to characterise them (not entirely jokingly)
> as basically a series of security flaws joined together by a physics
> engine.
*lol*
Regards,
Christian Boltz
--
The updated behavior seems to be that this is happening on a weekly
basis like clockwork. The problem disappears approximately somewhere
between Wednesday to Saturday each week, only to reappear somewhere
approximately Sunday to Wednesday each week. [Ton Su in bnc#727586]
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