[apparmor] [patch] can ?not fix

[Christian Boltz]

Hello,

Am Donnerstag, 5. Dezember 2013 schrieb Seth Arnold:
> On Thu, Dec 05, 2013 at 10:50:56PM +0100, Christian Boltz wrote:
> > as discussed on #apparmor yesterday, here's the most important patch
> > we've ever seen ;-)
> > 
> > References: https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853661

> Ha! The best part about this is that the entire section needs to be
> re-written, as it is several years out of date:

Well, it's the first time I touched this file. You know what this means? ;-)

> So, while the patch itself looks good, there's bigger problems that
> need to be fixed. :)

I was afraid of that ;-)

Here's an updated (and much bigger) patch that
- removes the note about can ?not mknod
- also removes mount and umount from the can ?not list which are covered
  by mount rules now (are the remaining parts still valid?)
- updates the example audit.log lines to the current log format
- updates the description of the log format
  BTW: Is the   
      ("Name"is in quotes, because the process name is limited to 15 bytes; [...]
  part still valid?


=== modified file 'parser/apparmor.pod'
--- parser/apparmor.pod 2010-12-20 20:29:10 +0000
+++ parser/apparmor.pod 2013-12-08 14:32:51 +0000
@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
 #    Copyright (c) 2010
 #    Canonical Ltd. (All rights reserved)
 #
+#    Copyright (c) 2013
+#    Christian Boltz (All rights reserved)
+#
 #    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 #    modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
 #    License published by the Free Software Foundation.
@@ -89,43 +92,46 @@
 cannot call the following system calls:
 
        create_module(2) delete_module(2) init_module(2) ioperm(2)
-       iopl(2) mount(2) umount(2) ptrace(2) reboot(2) setdomainname(2)
+       iopl(2) ptrace(2) reboot(2) setdomainname(2)
        sethostname(2) swapoff(2) swapon(2) sysctl(2)
 
-A confined process can not call mknod(2) to create character or block devices.
-
 =head1 ERRORS
 
 When a confined process tries to access a file it does not have permission
 to access, the kernel will report a message through audit, similar to:
 
-       audit(1148420912.879:96): REJECTING x access to /bin/uname
-         (sh(6646) profile /tmp/sh active /tmp/sh)
-
-       audit(1148420912.879:97): REJECTING r access to /bin/uname
-         (sh(6646) profile /tmp/sh active /tmp/sh)
-
-       audit(1148420944.837:98): REJECTING access to capability
-         'dac_override' (sh(6641) profile /tmp/sh active /tmp/sh)
-
-
-The permissions requested by the process are immediately after
-REJECTING. The "name" and process id of the running program are reported,
-as well as the profile name and any "hat" that may be active. ("Name"
+       audit(1386511672.612:238): apparmor="DENIED" operation="exec" 
+         parent=7589 profile="/tmp/sh" name="/bin/uname" pid=7605 
+         comm="sh" requested_mask="x" denied_mask="x" fsuid=0 ouid=0
+
+       audit(1386511672.613:239): apparmor="DENIED" operation="open" 
+         parent=7589 profile="/tmp/sh" name="/bin/uname" pid=7605 
+         comm="sh" requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=0 ouid=0
+
+       audit(1386511772.804:246): apparmor="DENIED" operation="capable"
+         parent=7246 profile="/tmp/sh" pid=7589 comm="sh" pid=7589 
+         comm="sh" capability=2  capname="dac_override"
+
+The permissions requested by the process are described in the operation=
+and denied_mask= (for files - capabilities etc. use a slightly different
+log format).
+The "name" and process id of the running program are reported,
+as well as the profile name including any "hat" that may be active, 
+separated by "//". ("Name"
 is in quotes, because the process name is limited to 15 bytes; it is the
-same as reported through the Berkeley process accounting.) If no hat is
-active (see aa_change_hat(2)) then the profile name is printed for "active".
+same as reported through the Berkeley process accounting.)
 
 For confined processes running under a profile that has been loaded in 
 complain mode, enforcement will not take place and the log messages 
 reported to audit will be of the form:
 
-       audit(1146868287.904:237): PERMITTING r access to
-         /etc/apparmor.d/tunables (du(3811) profile /usr/bin/du active
-         /usr/bin/du)
+       audit(1386512577.017:275): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open"
+         parent=8012 profile="/usr/bin/du" name="/etc/apparmor.d/tunables/"
+         pid=8049 comm="du" requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0
 
-       audit(1146868287.904:238): PERMITTING r access to /etc/apparmor.d
-         (du(3811) profile /usr/bin/du active /usr/bin/du)
+       audit(1386512577.017:276): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open"
+         parent=8012 profile="/usr/bin/du" name="/etc/apparmor.d/tunables/"
+         pid=8049 comm="du" requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0
 
 
 If the userland auditd is not running, the kernel will send audit events




Regards,

Christian Boltz
-- 
Was spricht gegen einen Punkt im Expertenmodus:
    [ ] Ich weiß nicht, was eine Partition ist.
Wenn einer das anklickt, ist klar, daß er Anfänger ist.
[Bernd Brodesser in suse-linux]